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**GUYANA**

**CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAMME**

**(GY-0071)**

**LOAN PROPOSAL**

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### Electronic Links and References

Annex II. Procurement Plan	<a href="http://opsws3.reg.iadb.org/idbdocswebservices/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=748932">http://opsws3.reg.iadb.org/idbdocswebservices/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=748932</a>
Basic Socioeconomic Data	<a href="http://www.iadb.org/RES/index.cfm?fuseaction=externallinks.countrydata">http://www.iadb.org/RES/index.cfm?fuseaction=externallinks.countrydata</a>
Status of Loan in Execution & Loans Approved	<a href="http://portal.iadb.org/approvals/pdfs/GYen.pdf">http://portal.iadb.org/approvals/pdfs/GYen.pdf</a>
Tentative Lending Program	<a href="http://opsgs1/ABSPRJ/tentativelending.ASP?S=GY&amp;L=EN">http://opsgs1/ABSPRJ/tentativelending.ASP?S=GY&amp;L=EN</a>

## ABBREVIATIONS

CAC	Community Action Component
CAO	Community Action Officers
CDCS	Community Development Committees
CS	Country Strategy
DFID	Department for International Development
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPF	Guyana Police Force
GOG	Government of Guyana
ICAS	Institutional Capacity Assessment System
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCYS	Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relieve Initiative
MOED	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOLHSSS	Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NDC	Neighborhood Development Council
NGOS	Non Governmental Organizations
NPV	Net Present Value
OC	Ordinary Capital
PC	Policy Committee
PCR	Project Completion Report
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PRU	Policy and Research Unit
SCP	Social Cohesion Programme
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

**PROJECT SUMMARY**  
**GUYANA**  
**CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAM**  
**(GY-0071)**

<b>Financial Terms and Conditions <sup>1</sup></b>				
Borrower: Co-operative Republic of Guyana			Amortization Period:	40 years
Executing Agency: Ministry of Home Affairs			Grace Period:	10 years
			Disbursement Period:	5 years
<b>Source</b>	<b>Amount (US\$ mill)</b>	<b>%</b>	Interest Rate:	1% first 10years, 2% thereafter
IDB (FSO)	19.8 millions	90%	Supervision and Inspection Fee:	1%
Local	2.2 millions	10%		
Other/Cofinancing			Credit Fee:	0.5%
Total	22 millions	100%	Currency:	US dollars
<b>Project at a Glance</b>				
<p><b>Project objective:</b>  The goal of the program is to enhance citizen security and coexistence among Guyanese citizens by contributing to the reduction of crime, violence and insecurity. To accomplish this, the program will finance technical assistance, computer equipment, software and rehabilitation of infrastructure to: (i) strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Home Affairs to lead a comprehensive, sustainable preventive effort, improving its overall its institutional performance and ability to develop, implement and evaluate evidence-based policies; (ii) support the reform and transformation of the Guyana Police Force into a modern professional institution that relies on data analysis to carry out preventive interventions; and (iii) development of evidence-based community-based preventive interventions with extensive community participation.</p> <p><b>Special contractual clauses:</b> Presentation of evidence that the operating manual agreed with the Bank has entered into effect (¶3.14.)</p> <p><b>Special Execution Condition:</b> The commitments of the loan resources for the rehabilitations of police stations outside regions IV and VI will be subject to the prior Bank's approval of the criteria for selecting them. Furthermore, the agreed criteria will be part of the Operating Regulations of the Programme. (¶2.7)</p> <p><b>Exceptions to Bank policies:</b> None</p> <p><b>Project consistent with Country Strategy:</b> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Project qualifies for: SEQ<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PTI <input type="checkbox"/> Sector <input type="checkbox"/> Geographic <input type="checkbox"/> Headcount <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Procurement:</b> See paragraphs ¶ 3.15  The acquisition of works, goods and related services (different from consulting services) will be carried out by the PIU at the MoHA in accordance with the provisions set forth in Document GN-2349-6 (Policies for the Procurement of Works and Goods Financed by the Inter-American Development Bank). The selection and contracting of consulting services will be also carried out by the PIU in accordance with the provisions set forth in Document GN-2350-6 (Policies for the Selection and Contracting of Consultants Financed by the Inter-American Development Bank)</p> <p><b>Verified by CESI on:</b> Not applicable</p>				

<sup>1</sup> The interest rate, credit fee, and inspection and supervision fee mentioned in this document are established pursuant to document FN-568-3 Rev. and may be changed by the Board of Executive Directors, taking into account the available background information, as well as the respective Finance Department recommendations. In no case will the credit fee exceed 0.75%, or the inspection and supervision fee exceed 1% of the loan amount (\*)

(\*) With regard to the inspection and supervision fee, in no case will the charge exceed, in a given six-month period, the amount that would result from applying 1% to the loan amount divided by the number of six-month periods included in the original disbursement period.

## I. FRAME OF REFERENCE

### A. Introduction

- 1.1 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bank estimates the costs of crime and violence in the range between 5%-10% of GDP.<sup>1</sup> At an aggregate level, crime negatively affects the enabling environment of the economy and social development. The impact on economic growth occurs through dents in human capital accumulation, income, investment (both domestic and foreign) and productivity. Violence degrades the quality of life for many citizens, inducing a vicious circle in which physical and social disarray in a community is both cause and effect of escalating neighborhood crime and violence. More recently, evidence suggests that the link between violence and crime with underdevelopment is particularly strong in small states<sup>2</sup>. When such states are close to drug shipment areas, as the Caribbean is, their exposure to crime and violence is increased.
- 1.2 In response to these regional realities, the growing awareness of a national problem and unique challenges present in the country (very weak organized civil society and governmental infrastructure), the GoG has requested Bank's assistance in developing a program that focuses on the prevention and reduction of crime and violence, and public sector and civil society capacity building. Prevention has been long understood to be an investment<sup>3</sup> that reduces substantial future expenditures in the following categories: anticipation of crime (security and insurance costs); consequences of crime (such as stolen property, physical effects on victims, and health services); and in response to crime (criminal justice systems).<sup>4</sup> Prevention is also known to be a cost-effective intervention to deal with crime and violence vis-à-vis suppression or control measures, as evidenced in studies measuring the return for each dollar spent on anti-violence programs in Canada, Netherlands, UK and US.<sup>5</sup> The following sections summarize the macroeconomic framework before describing the current crime situation in Guyana and institutional context for this prevention programme.

### B. Socioeconomic Framework

- 1.3 The macroeconomic context in Guyana changed substantially between the period 1991-1997 and 1998-2005. Economic growth averaged only 0.2% per annum over 1998-2005, in contrast to an annual average growth of 7.1% over 1991-1997. Domestic investment lost dynamism, falling by 12.8% of GDP during the same period, largely as a result of a decline in private investment by around 11% of

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<sup>1</sup> Buvinic and Morrison (1999). Technical Note: Violence Prevention. Washington, DC. IADB

<sup>2</sup> Commonwealth/World Bank Joint Task Force 2005; Easterly and Kraay, 2000

<sup>3</sup> Government of Canada, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> UK's Home Office, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Foundation Docteur Philippe-Pinel, 2004.

GDP. FDI flows to Guyana fell severely to 6.6% of GDP in 1998-2005 (compared to 19% of GDP previously). Public investment, however, has become more vigorous recently, increasing nearly twofold from 12.6% of GDP in 2002 to 24.5% in 2005, which suggests a possible crowding-out of private investment or substituting for what the private sector does not want to finance.

- 1.4 Fiscal and monetary reforms and foreign exchange policy led to price stability during the 1990s. Inflation fell from around 100% at the beginning of the 1990s to one-digit levels in 1996. More recently, high oil prices, among other factors, put some pressure on inflation, but levels are still moderate (7.1% in 2005). The exchange rate was stable, especially after 1999, which helped to maintain price stability. In addition, the performance of the external sector improved from a current account deficit over 25% of GDP in early 1990s to 5.2% of GDP in 2004. However, the external imbalance jumped to almost 16% in 2005, due primarily to the trade deficit. The country's fiscal position deteriorated gradually over the last seven years, from a deficit of 1.7% of GDP in 1999 to 8.7% of GDP in 2003. Despite an improvement in 2004, the fiscal deficit worsened to reach 13.4% of GDP in 2005.<sup>6</sup> Although the multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI) has already reduced the Net Present Value (NPV) of external debt-to-revenue ratio to an estimated 217 % in 2005, which is below the 250% indicative threshold, Guyana is still at moderate risk for debt distress.<sup>7</sup>
- 1.5 The deterioration in Guyana's security environment was most marked from 2002 to 2006 with an alarming increase in crime and violence which corresponds with the period of poor economic performance (1998-2005). This period saw a sharp drop in national and international private sector activity, which translated into weaker growth and a period of post 2001 election violence and instability. The crime and violence prevention activities that will be financed by the proposed program are expected to foster a better environment for private investment. This will have positive effects on economic growth as well as create a more enabling environment for civic participation in promoting The Realizing Safe Neighborhoods Survey and a more stable society.

### **C. Characteristics of crime and violence**

- 1.6 The growing concern with crime and violence in Guyana has placed citizen security and crime reduction among the leading policy priorities of the national authorities. Discerning the true extent and nature of crime and violence is a challenge, and the paucity of reliable and timely data inhibits the ability of the government to develop informed policies. Available data from police reports show (see Figure 1) that homicide rates in Guyana from 1974 to 2001 have fluctuated around 10-15/100,000 (except for peaks in 1983-22 and 1991-25) but increasing from 2002 (peak of 27 in 2003) onwards to closer to 18 /100,000.


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<sup>6</sup> Several factors are responsible, including public sector wage increases in 2000, increased spending on social programs throughout the period, flood disaster relief in early 2005 and capital investments by the public sector (particularly infrastructure projects and construction of the Skeldon sugar factory).

<sup>7</sup> MDRI would provide Guyana with roughly US\$237 million in debt relief.


Moreover, Figure 1 also shows a growing trend from 1974 to 2005 in the robbery rates.

**Figure 1. Homicide and Robbery Rates**



- 1.7 Regional studies suggest that the trajectory of violent crime in Guyana appears similar to the patterns experienced by other Caribbean countries<sup>8</sup>. During the last decade, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have experienced fairly high and steadily increasing incidence of gun use in the commission of violent crimes, and a higher ratio of violent crime to property crime. This is most evident in the movement of the homicide rates. Since the mid-1980s, at least four Commonwealth Caribbean countries have experienced periods of very high homicide rates: Guyana, Jamaica, the Bahamas and St Kitts.<sup>9</sup>
- 1.8 Moreover, traffic accidents are also an important contributor to involuntary homicides and long-term disabilities, further eroding feelings of security in Guyana. Over the last 10 years, the rate of traffic deaths has had an upward trend from approximately 16-24/100,000. The authorities in Guyana have stressed the urgency of dealing with this problem in the very short term, reducing road deaths and injuries and providing the police and the authorities with an opportunity to show rapid improvements in the security environment.

**Figure 2. Traffic Death Rates**



Source: Guyana Police Force statistics

- 1.9 A profile of the perpetrator of violent crime has begun to emerge from available national data. This individual is most often a repeat offender; in 80% of the cases

<sup>8</sup> Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003

<sup>9</sup> Observers note that a rate of 20\100,000 may be regarded as being high by Latin American standards and very high by Commonwealth Caribbean standards given that the mean rate for the region is rarely above 10\100,000.

the age of the individual is between 14 and 30 years, is a male, has dropped out of school, is unemployed, or underemployed, or has low school performance. It should be noted there has been an increase in the number of female youths arrested for wandering, shoplifting, armed assault and drug-carrying.

- 1.10 An added dimension to the problem of violence is the ethnic polarization among Guyanese. It has engendered a culture of fear and mistrust with deleterious economic, social and cultural consequences detracting from collective efforts to build inclusion and sustainable responses to the problem of violence. The lack of confidence in communities has been attributed to perceptions of racial profiling, leading to allegations of discrimination and allegations of extra-judicial killings<sup>10</sup>.
- 1.11 Specific geographic and administrative regions appear to be disproportionately affected by violent crime and violence. Regions IV and VI have the highest numbers of children (145,258 and 57,739 respectively – out of a total national child population of 354,176, per the 2002 census) and adolescents, who are at traditionally high risk for victimization and perpetration of various forms of violence.
- 1.12 Survey data from the baseline Realizing Safe Neighborhoods household survey reveals that 20.8% and 22.1% in Region IV and VI, respectively, were victims of one or more forms of crime and violence within the last year. The number of deaths with undetermined causes in Regions IV and VI from November 2005 to April 2006 is 23 out of a total of 66. Citizens interviewed in both regions are experiencing multiple losses due to homicide and other forms of violent crime: Respondents expressed a diminishing sense of personal safety, increased levels of fear and dissatisfaction that are impacting on their daily lives – with 42% and 49% of those interviewed (in Region IV and VI respectively) not feeling safe on the streets of their community at night. Interviewed residents have given some or a great deal of consideration to moving to another city or area within or outside of the country as a result of crime and violence – 40% and 31% in Region IV and VI respectively. Sixty percent of those interviewed in both regions expressed that the crime situation made them feel ashamed of their country.
- 1.13 Given the weakness of surveillance systems,<sup>11</sup> ad hoc collection of data and information through assessments was undertaken as part of project preparation in communities in Region IV and VI to identify other priority issues for action.<sup>12</sup> When provided with appropriate methods, communities are capable of identifying

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<sup>10</sup> UN Human Rights System, Thematic Reports: Racism and Racial Discrimination, 2003

<sup>11</sup> An information system that routinely collects a minimum set of information about the circumstances of events.

<sup>12</sup> The three elements of this approach are: (i) a community assessment allowing the identification of both the formal and informal strengths or assets which a community has in place, and of the gaps which may exist, as well as their problems and needs; (ii) a process of strengthening community capacity including the provision of expertise and resources necessary to address current gaps; and (iii) catalyzing community interest and energy for effective community mobilization, involving a combination of public education and the provision of external support.

priority risk factors for injuries and selecting sound interventions for preventing violence. Getting communities involved in the identification of a problem and its possible solution can offer the added benefit of increasing the relevance, acceptability and ownership of interventions.<sup>13</sup>

- 1.14 The assessments showed that violence is experienced in multiple forms, levels and settings across the lifecycle, and residents noted their interplay and impact on the community. It ranges from suicide; violence against children and youth (child abuse and neglect, harsh parental discipline of children and youth, witnessing or being a victim of intimate partner violence in the home); violence in the streets or community (youth violence, armed robbery) and in the broader society (among them exclusion, discrimination, sexism). The assessments underscore that local institutions, such as schools, health and social welfare institutions are ill-equipped to deal effectively with violence. The lack of or weak coordination among government institutions, insufficient accountability and transparency, outdated training to prepare law enforcement and service professionals to address new trends in crime and violence, shortage of skilled personnel, low morale leading to low professional standards, lack of appropriate services and outdated training and ways of working reveal the great difficulties in confronting the increase crime and violence problem. These problems also enable timely prevention and intervention opportunities in the homes, schools, community and institutions to be routinely by passed. Pervasive fear was also described as a contributor to crime. Residents spoke of the results of this fear: the gradual diminishment of participation in community and civic life; fewer interactions with youth and children and other community parents; decreased belief in police, and the rule of law causing underreporting; diminished contact with groups of other ethnic or racial backgrounds.
- 1.15 Actionable priorities were identified as part of the assessment that allow for the identification of immediate situational crime control actions and more long-term social development approaches to crime and violence prevention addressing individual, family and community level risk factors, engaging residents in voluntary actions (e.g. development of resident coexistence and violence prevention promoters). The Safe Neighborhood survey underscored the willingness of neighborhood residents to become involved – with 68% and 76% of those interviewed willing to participate in their neighborhoods.

#### **D. The citizen security sector**

##### **1. Sector Management**

- 1.16 The institutions within the citizen security sector primarily responsible for preventing and helping reduce crime and violence in the country include both public institutions and civil society organizations. The Ministry of Home Affairs

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<sup>13</sup> Klevens J, and M. Anderson, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 9–15; and Catalano RF, Arthur MW, Hawkins JD, Berglund L, Olson JJ. In: Loeber R, Farrington DP, eds. 1998 Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998:281–283.

(MoHA), established in 1961, is responsible for internal security and immigration. Its mission is to formulate and evaluate public order and safety policies, and to assist in the protection and maintenance of the country's social fabric. The MoHA has an annual budget of US\$30 million (the majority of this budget goes to finance the agencies under the Ministry) and 69 employees, excluding personnel of agencies attached to the MoHA, which one third are professionals. The agencies currently within the portfolio of the MoHA are: (i) the Guyana Police Force (GPF) which has among its functions the prevention and detection of crime, preservation of law and order, the preservation of peace, control of public order, protection of property, the enforcement of all laws and regulations and other duties required or under the authority of the Minister; (ii) the Police Complaints Authority, in charge of receiving and investigating complaints against the GPF; (iii) Guyana Prison Service, in charge of the custody of prisoners; (iv) Guyana Fire Service, which provides prevention and extinguishing of fires; and the General Register Office, which maintains the national records of births, deaths and marriages.

- 1.17 Shifting the paradigm of citizen security from a narrow focus on control to broader, preventive policies will require the adoption of new organizational structures, articulated efforts, acquisition of new proficiencies and modern perspectives to accommodate and support pro-active capabilities.

## **2. Sector constraints**

### **a) Ministry of Home Affairs and other institutions**

- 1.18 Based on an institutional assessment of the Ministry, the following sector constraints have been identified:
- 1.19 Limited capacity to formulate and evaluate violence prevention and coexistence policies. Due to the weaknesses in data collection, sectoral and comprehensive national policy formulation based on reliable crime and violence data is not feasible. Presently, there is no information system (standardized procedures for performing tasks and data collection) that integrates forensic medicine, crime investigation and policing in general, and the prosecution offices (information regarding the resolution of cases). Currently, the Ministry of Health (MoH) receives the information on causes of external deaths approximately 6 months after the police reviews the information, and does not take other sources of information into consideration for validation. Georgetown Public Hospital receives the largest number of victims of crime and violence in the country and collects data on the different cases. Therefore, the data from the GPF and Georgetown hospital will be the primary sources of data for the integrated data system.
- 1.20 Even though the MoHA has a Policy and Research Unit (PRU-comprising of 5 staff members and is in the process of being expanded to approximately 10 professionals), it has limited capacity in monitoring program analysis,

implementation and evaluation. Efforts are hampered by a paucity of staff trained in the various disciplines and approaches required for the successful execution of a broad national strategy. To date, this has impeded the development of policies (such as legislative and regulatory actions), which have been successful in reducing levels of violence in other countries in the Region, and thus reduced its capacity to develop and test new, local responses to crime and violence. The lack of a functioning policy capacity, combined with the absence of a formal program evaluation capacity limits the ability of the Ministry to assess programmatic effectiveness, and carry out program evaluation of initiatives undertaken by other government institutions. Substantial efforts will be needed to prepare MoHA to lead and coordinate efforts to reorient national security strategies; develop, manage and evaluate comprehensive preventive approaches to crime and violence; work effectively with other ministries, civil society and local communities in novel and experimental areas in which new relationships, management and consultative approaches are required.

- 1.21 Absence of a formal and systematic engagement with in-country stakeholders. At present there are too few consistent mechanisms for engaging national and local stakeholders. The complexity of risk and protective factors surrounding the prevention of crime and violence requires effective coordination to facilitate partnering, sharing of information, as a means to reduce duplication, provide more intensive and targeted efforts, using the comparative advantage of key stakeholders. Effective crime and violence prevention models bring together a broad range of stakeholders (governmental, civil society, informal associations, community residents) and disciplines (such as health, education, law enforcement, welfare, culture, sports, business, religion, and youth) working together in an integrated manner to develop effective and sustainable solutions. This Commission and the evolution of other such initiatives at the local levels and special sectoral interest groups have the potential to enhance broader participation in crime prevention and reduction.
- 1.22 Varied ministry project portfolios have the untapped potential to contribute to the emerging citizen security strategy. For instance, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MCYS) programs to reach out-of school youth, offer opportunities to expand on violence prevention programming for hard to reach at-risk population in the pilot communities. Similarly, the Ministry of Education school-based life skills programs for all primary school children in Guyana, can assist pilot community efforts in addressing the high number of children leaving school, and the increasing percentage of youth unprepared to face life after school through coordination, provision of needed services and educational materials.
- 1.23 Civil society initiatives with specialist knowledge can inform and serve as dissemination vehicles for the broad national citizen security strategy, but are not formally articulated with the GoG. NGOs, which focus on child abuse and domestic violence and women's groups, which were instrumental in getting the 1996 domestic violence law passed are well respected in the international gender

violence prevention field and offer services though with limited human resources, can be utilized in the proposed program activities.

- 1.24 Inadequate institutional framework. The MoHA faces key institutional challenges that affect its ability to address new crime and violence trends and threats to public safety and peace. The Ministry is only one of several organizations that make up the core of the criminal justice system, and its effectiveness is dependent upon close collaboration with a wide range of agencies. An Institutional Capacity Assessment System-Risk Analysis (ICAS) evaluation of MoHA revealed systemic weaknesses in the areas of strategic and operational planning, organizational management, human resource management, goods and service management, financial administration and internal control. Deficiencies in these areas reduce the overall performance of the institution, discourage long-term institutional planning and result in procedural and process-related inefficiency. Furthermore, the Ministry lacks a strategic plan and operational planning capability. There is no strategic plan to guide MoHA's activities and the annual plan of operations is guided by the program budget developed with the Ministry of Finance and approved by the National Assembly with specific performance objectives and institutional performance indicators. The Ministry requires support to develop and implement the necessary systems, including the change management process required to successfully implement them.
- 1.25 MoHA's organizational structure needs to be revisited to enable the Ministry to effectively adopt a proactive prevention posture. Job descriptions need to be reviewed and updated, skill levels assessed and a robust and transparent human resource management system implemented with a comprehensive training programme tied to organizational needs. Organizational productivity can be improved by the use of appropriate information and communications technologies, the development of computer applications for different procedures in the Ministry and networking capabilities among the different units. Moreover, some infrastructure rehabilitation to accommodate new equipment and additional staff is also needed.

### **3. Guyana Police Force**

- 1.26 Inadequate policing method. The lack of adequate resources particularly, academically trained personnel, has hampered the performance of the GPF<sup>14</sup>. It has resulted in a reliance on incident driven, reactive approaches, and a limited ability to analyze crime and violence patterns, incidents, problems and causes. There is a need to support the development of the officers' skills in the analysis of patterns, incidents and problems to be able to propose evidence-based sustainable solutions. Their ability to work in partnership with communities in broader social development and crime prevention efforts seeking to address the root causes of crime needs to be enhanced. The Realizing Safe Neighborhoods survey

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<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that Guyana spends approximately 0.37% of GDP in the GPF compared to 0.54% to 0.59% of GDP in countries of similar size.

underscored that 34% and 36% of Region IV and VI interviewees do not believe the GPF is doing a good job in preventing crime. 44% and 58% of Region IV and VI respondents do not believe that the GPF responds promptly to emergency calls – and a total of 17% have had a family member mistreated by the police in the last 12 months.

- 1.27 Furthermore, the institution has been unable to adopt new technologies that allow for the collection and preservation of evidence so it can be presented appropriately to the courts. Police officers often lack the training to testify and produce evidence in the courts in a professional manner. The service has been slow to incorporate new schools of thought on policing and criminology, and do not project a professional policing approach. Improved management at the Divisional level would allow for greater efficiency and effectiveness in its overall performance.
- 1.28 A modern approach to policing also requires the active engagement of organized communities. Guyana has a tradition of community involvement in crime prevention. In 1976 in an effort to develop community-police relation especially as the GPF was severely short of resources community-policing groups were formed to assist in crime prevention. In order to enhance the partnership between the GPF and the community policing groups a Ministerial Unit on Community Policing has been recently established. At present there are about 300 groups with approximately 4 members each. However, these groups are made up of volunteers , which some are made Rural Constables.
- 1.29 In essence, the organizational infrastructure of the GPF requires be re-designed to support a pro-active capability. This will be based on intelligence gathering the development of a service orientation, partnership, problem solving and analytical ability. This will allow for the resources of GPF to be directed to the resolution of problems and issues in a more sustainable and accountable fashion. This approach, tied to an enhanced investigative ability of the GPF, and greater accountability for addressing the needs and concerns of communities will ensure greater professionalism in police matters and earn the organization respect, while generating confidence and providing reassurance for the public of Guyana.
- 1.30 Institutional constraints In terms of the institution's structure, organizational configuration, doctrine, training and police procedures, these have remained essentially unchanged since the 1960s. The GPF also lacks a human resource strategy that incorporates policies on selection qualifications, training, evaluation, promotion and personal development, as well as a modern human resources management policy. The report on the Commission on Disciplined Forces made a number of recommendations on these issues, which the Select Committee of Parliament supported.
- 1.31 Moreover, the strengthening of the Office of Professional Responsibility of the GPF and revision of the Police Service Commission rules governing improper

police behavior and corruption, will help to implement appropriate accountability mechanism that allow for transparent investigations of complaints.

- 1.32 Presently, GPF makes limited use of planning as a strategic instrument to identify its goals and pursue achievements. Internal controls are inadequate for compliance with audit standards. Weak capacity in budgeting and managing an integrated financing system and inadequate resources (in particular human resources) makes long-term institutional planning a challenge. The weaknesses in the systems supporting the administrative areas, also affects the performance of the organization.
- 1.33 The senior officers of the GPF are committed to the modernization and reform of the force. The Guyana Police Force has developed a long-term plan to improve organisational performance and enhance public confidence, serving as the basis for this program. The strategic development plan also identified the following key areas for reform, since they represent important institutional shortcomings: (i) design of a new organizational structure of the force, as well as the processes that will support the new structure, including corporate planning, policy-setting, and measurement of performance; (ii) development of personnel policy procedures, including fundamental issues around recruitment, pay and conditions of service; (iii) development of effective support services, including financial management, information technology, communications and infrastructure rehabilitation; (iv) comprehensive training program for all senior management involved in the reform process; (v) the creation of a sustainable training and development capability to support organizational change and redevelopment and (vi) establishment of a strengthened complaints and discipline department.

#### **E. Government's strategy**

- 1.34 The GoG requested the Bank's assistance in developing a programme that focuses in crime and violence prevention. This programme, in turn will provide elements that will form part of the overall country security strategy presently under preparation in the area of crime and violence prevention. The proposed Programme will also strengthen the MoHA capacity in collecting and analyzing data, as well as, designing and implementing key preventive interventions. It will also assist in the modernization of the GPF by supporting the change to an evidence-based model with support of the community. Finally, the overall country security strategy is one of the Bank's country strategy indicators. These indicators have to be complied with before the country can access financing for infrastructure projects.
- 1.35 Prior to this preparation of this program, a number of initiatives of varying effectiveness have been undertaken by the Government of Guyana to address sectoral constraints. A National Commission on Law and Order comprised of representatives of government, Parliament, and civil society has been appointed with the mandate to examine existing and proposed policies and to make policy recommendations to the President. MoHA will present to the Commission the

evidence-based policy interventions that will be undertaken in the proposed program for information purposes and will also coordinate the additional policy and actions that the Commission will undertake.

- 1.36 The GoG also published the National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2005-2009, which proposes a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach to control the level and penetration of drugs into society. The link between narco-trafficking and the proliferation of illicit guns supporting the execution of violent crime and violence has been long established. The Drug Strategy will help to achieve improved coordination among law enforcement agencies and other stakeholder agencies and help prevent the inflow of weapons and drugs.
- 1.37 Outreach and coordination efforts by the GoG to increase participation among key stakeholders and promote a new, prevention ethos have not been uniformly strong and continue to be highly centralized. The GoG and several partner agencies, such as the Ethnic Relations Commission and the National Commission on the Rights of the Child are also developing programmes promoting civic responsibility and tolerance in interpersonal relationships and activities promoting the protection of children and spouses from abuse and violence. However, there are limitations to coordinate and ensure coherence in these programmes being implemented.
- 1.38 A comprehensive strategy for the reform of the criminal justice sector is being developed. It aims to improve governance by implementing actions that would make the justice system more trusted, accountable and accessible. This reform will be supported by the Bank's Modernization of the Justice Administration System Programme (GY-L1009) currently under preparation. Since the Guyana Police Force is a key institution in the justice system as a whole, given its role of prevention and detection of crime and the preservation of law and order, the Citizen Security Programme will contribute to the sector reform by improving the performance of the institution in crime prevention, strengthening its capacity to investigate crimes while protecting the human rights of citizens and by making the institution more accountable to citizens.
- 1.39 Finally, the GoG intends to pursue its goals and objectives through a sequential approach with a set of short-term and pilot-oriented interventions focused on capacity building, in the first stage and to be followed by a second stage aimed at the implementation of activities identified in the comprehensive strategy. The GoG considers the proposed programme as the pivotal support for the first stage.

**F. Bank's country strategy and lessons learned**

- 1.40 The Bank's country strategy (CS), which was approved in 2002, prioritizes three development challenges confronting the country: achieving sustainable economic growth (with support for private sector development and infrastructure); improving governance and public sector efficiency; and strengthening social programs. The CS noted the negative impact of increasing crime and violence on

both the quality of life of citizens and investor confidence in Guyana. Accordingly, the CS made provision for an operation to address challenges to citizen security and justice. Subsequent discussions with the GoG led to the development of two separate projects, which complement each other and will both be approved in mid-2006. The CS also highlighted the strengthening of citizen security and justice as key elements of a comprehensive Public Policy Agenda that serves as a complement to the operational pipeline defined in the CS. The Bank has been monitoring the authorities' progress on a series of critical reform indicators under this Agenda, and fulfillment of these indicators influences the amount of concessional funding approved by the Bank. A comprehensive strategy for improving citizen security, being developed during the preparation of this project with Bank support, is one of the indicators.

- 1.41 The Bank has considerable experience in other countries in the region in the area of violence prevention and citizen security. To date, the Bank has financed operations in Colombia, Uruguay, Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua. It also has operations in preparation in Guatemala, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The operations in Bogotá, Colombia and Uruguay have been completed and have yielded significant results and key lessons that have been included in the design of the proposed programme. Some of the most effective interventions to reduce violence included: (i) the creation of an observatory for crime and violence; (ii) design of campaigns to deal with specific risk factors such as citizens' use of guns and alcohol consumption; (iii) actions to recuperate decayed urban spaces; (iv) neighborhood crime-monitoring committees and creation of conflict resolution at the community level; (v) creation of special police stations to serve victims of domestic violence; and (vi) modernization and professionalization of the police force to work in collaboration with communities and proceed, based on evidence, to address crime and violence and to find new ways to engage communities that are hostile to police presence. Furthermore, in order to avoid possible delays in the implementation period that affected the operations in Colombia and Uruguay, the proposed programme has main differences: (i) more concentrated action for improving governmental response to crime and violence; (ii) a more comprehensive approach for addressing institutional issues faced by the police; and (iii) greater attention during the design of the operation to ensure a results framework, including appropriate data collection and monitoring systems.

**G. Coordination with other donors.**

- 1.42 The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has supported the police force management in the elaboration of a Strategic Development Plan that serves as the basis for the present police reform program. Additionally, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, also of the UK, has financed training interventions to the GPF to develop practice and procedures (operational and tactical police management and public order management) to achieve a safer community. The actions to be financed by the proposed Bank operation will complement this training. Moreover, the comprehensive training strategy that

will be developed as part of the operation will coordinate all future training for the GPF.

- 1.43 UNICEF has extended an invitation to form collaborative partnerships with various Government agencies, such as MinLHSSS and MinCYS to jointly develop materials, coordinate activities and identify community human resources in the targeted communities addressing violence and children, through their XChange project, a multi-level effort to create safe and protective environments for children and adolescents. XChange seeks to mainstream protection of children and adolescents from all types of violence in policy and legislative frameworks, create networks of young people knowledgeable about non-violence, assist in the development of community-based approaches for the protection of children against violence with linkages to service delivery for replication and scaling up, and improve systems for early identification and intervention of children and adolescents affected by violence. Initiatives will include the development of a child monitoring national Child Protection Monitoring System, which will serve as a basis for monitoring all children's issues and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The actions to be financed by the proposed Bank operation will build on and deepen the crime and violence prevention work of this project at the local level.
- 1.44 The Guyana Social Cohesion Programme (SCP), a UNDP administered programme, working with the Ethnic Relations Commission, builds capacity for social cohesion and peace building at national, regional and community levels; SCP foresees the prevention of racial discrimination, and xenophobia. It provides useful tools, human resources and dialogue structures that can complement proposed programme efforts to mitigate distrust and foster inter-ethnic cooperation at the local level. This programme provides a possible mechanism for coordination with the MoHA.

## **H. Programme strategy**

- 1.45 The program has a two pronged strategy: (i) a short term strategy of actions at the community level promoting social cohesion and resident participation with immediate effects, and (ii) a medium term strategy based on data collection, analysis and evaluation of violence-based interventions. The latter will develop evidence-based crime and violence prevention strategies and monitor trends through the development and implementation of an integrated information system to address critical gaps in knowledge. Training will be provided to build capacity in data analysis and promote the adoption of strategies that address key risk factors. Enhanced information will assist in the implementation of well-designed prevention initiatives built on four inter-related pillars: (i) the incorporation of developmental prevention strategies (such as socio-cognitive approaches) that address factors leading to violent offending; (ii) situational crime prevention strategies which diminish opportunities for crime by modifying the situation in which offending occurs, and building an environment less conducive to crime; and (iii) community strategies which involve joint ownership by local residents,

national and local governments and civil society of crime and violence prevention. An important part of the GoG strategy is the involvement of communities, which are increasingly viewed as a critical avenue for prevention. The prevention of violence may hinge on the ability to help reshape community life. Local Government, families, schools, retail establishments, Police and Prison Officials need to operate and address the new and growing challenges that communities face. The success and failure of these institutions tends to directly correlated with the capacities of the communities in which they operate.

- 1.46 The program will be a pilot phase with an urban focus covering communities with various types of crime and violence in Regions IV and VI. These two regions are the most populous and have high rates of crime and violence, a high proportion of youth population and single parent families. High school dropout rates (especially in primary school and early secondary school), single parent families, inadequate childcare, and lack of integrated community services further exacerbate risks of violence. Evaluations of these pilot interventions will provide the information necessary to determine how effective the early impacts of these interventions are in reducing crime and violence.

## **II. THE PROGRAM**

### **A. Objectives**

- 2.1 The goal of the program is to enhance citizen security and coexistence by contributing to the reduction in levels of crime, violence and insecurity in Guyana. The specific objectives are to: (a) identify, prevent and counteract risk factors and increase and promote protective factors in communities, families and individuals; (b) strengthen the capabilities of MoHA and GPF to implement crime preventive programmes at the national and local levels, and (c) strengthen social cohesion within communities and their preventive capacity.

### **B. Programme Description**

- 2.2 In order to achieve the above objectives, the following activities have been identified:

#### **1. Capacity building of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) (US\$4.5 million)**

- 2.3 The component objective is to strengthen MoHA's capacity in: (i) the formulation, execution and evaluation of evidence-based policies; and (ii) human resource development and the improvement of the overall institutional performance of the Ministry. To achieve this and as part of the medium term strategy of the program described previously, this component will finance technical assistance, training, computer equipment and software to design, develop and implement the following:

- i. An integrated crime and violence information system (Crime Observatory US\$915,000) to monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange, plan strategically and support the development and evaluation of public policy responses in Regions IV and VI. This will entail the following: (a) new data system and geo-reference mapping; (b) applied training in statistical analysis and problem identification; (c) surveillance system of external causes of injuries and deaths<sup>15</sup>; and (d) data links to information generated by forensic medicine, the prosecution office and the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA).
  - ii. The development of evidence based policies and interventions that address risk factors identified (US\$1.3 million). This subcomponent will address issues related to capacity for training for the PRU, development of policies, recommending legal reforms and formulating plans related to reducing violence and crime, and conducting educational and media campaigns.
  - iii. Evaluations to assess the impact of the interventions implemented, during and after the program (US\$0.5 million).
  - iv. Training of PRU staff and a cadre of local young professional interns (US\$0.6 million) of varied disciplinary backgrounds to support the Policy and Research Unit. This hands-on training, complemented by a post-secondary level course, will be related to how to develop, implement, evaluate and disseminate varied types of crime and violence prevention policies, programmes, and strategies, along with the fundamentals of collaborative partnership building. This will assure a continuum of trained staff for the PRU.
- 2.4 This component will also finance two additional national surveys (US\$240,000) *Realizing Safe Neighborhoods Survey*) to inform future policies and provide data against which program effects can be measured (in addition to data generated by the Crime Observatory). Survey information captures: (a) prevalence of aggressive and other violence-related behaviors, (b) personal attitudes toward aggression, (c) self-efficacy for alternatives to violence, (d) public perceptions of social institutions and the government, (e) violence victimization in the family and in the community, and by type of crime; (f) community experiences with policing; and (g) household socio-demographic information, inter-alia.
- 2.5 Technical assistance, equipment and software will be financed to improve the overall institutional performance of the Ministry through the development and implementation of: (i) an overall Strategic Action Plan (US\$600,000); (ii) Annual Plans of Operations consistent with the Strategic Action Plan; (iii) a new organizational structure, including new job profiles, to enable the Ministry to

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<sup>15</sup> This system will routinely collect a minimum set of information about the circumstances of events. A minimum data set will be established. A reportable case was defined as person who died from or was treated for an unintentional or violence-related injury. Unintentional injury cases included burns, car accidents, falls, and pedestrian injuries, among others. Violence-related cases included assaults, mutual fights, acts of self-defense against the aggressor, injuries inflicted by law-enforcement or military personnel, attacks intended for another victim.

respond to the mission and vision articulated in the Strategic Action Plan and achieve the goals and objectives defined in the Annual Plan of Operations, including new initiatives such as crime prevention and community interventions, among others; (iv) an integrated human resource management system consistent with public service management systems with computer application, for performance-based measurement of staff (and as part of this system a comprehensive and sustainable training program aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness due to increased or updated knowledge); (v) an internal audit system, based on modern internal control functions and risk analysis (in order to enhance in the short-run MoHA's internal audit capacity, an Internal Field/ Audit Officer will be hired to provide financial and procedural audit capability consistent with public sector procedures); (vi) an integrated financial administration system consistent with national public sector systems and regulations, integrating budget, treasury, accounting and acquisitions functions supported by the Integrated Financial Management and Accounting System; (vii) develop secure systems of processing, and producing national documents that promotes transparency and improve efficiency of service delivery; (viii) a communications and public relations strategy, to strengthen MoHA's image and its roles in relation to other national organizations; (ix) rehabilitation of physical infrastructure of the MoHA and acquisition of IT equipment/capability (US\$350,000); and (x) community development initiatives..

## **2. Capacity building and modernization of the GPF (US\$8 million).**

- 2.6 This component objective is to transform the Guyana Police Force from an incident-driven, reactive institution to one that relies on the analysis of patterns, incidents and problems in order to understand the characteristics and causes of incidents, which will ensure sustainable solutions. To achieve this, the component will finance technical assistance, equipment and rehabilitation of infrastructure to develop and implement the following: (i) An integrated crime information system (US\$250,000); (ii) Comprehensive training scheme (US\$1.6 million) -professional standard of training and training the trainers- in: a) investigation and detection of crime; b) information management (how to record, handle and use the data in a proactive manner); c) recruit training; d) case management; e) ethnic human rights and neighborhood policing; and (f) strengthening of internal and external accountability mechanisms.
- 2.7 This component will also finance technical assistance to strengthen the traffic department and develop a new urban traffic management plan (US\$100,000). It will include proposals for revision of the legislation governing road safety including partnering with community groups and local government bodies; training for the GPF to enforce legislation, educating the public on road safety; implementation of traffic management standards, accident investigation and reconstruction <sup>16</sup>. It will also finance the modernizations of physical

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<sup>16</sup> These activities will be coordinated with the Road Safety Unit of the Ministry of Public Works and Communication (Work Services Group.)

infrastructure such as the construction of a new crime laboratory (including equipment) and the construction of a new training facility (including IT equipment) (US\$5 million). The final designs for these facilities are completed. This component will also finance the rehabilitation and remodeling of police stations to improve service to citizens reporting crimes (especially in protecting identities and taking reports, for instance, in domestic abuse cases) and improving crime prevention capabilities. The commitments of the loan resources for the rehabilitations of police stations outside regions IV and VI will be subject to the prior Bank's approval of the criteria for selecting them. Furthermore, the agreed criteria will be part of the Operating Regulations of the Programme.

- 2.8 Technical assistance, equipment and software will also be financed to improve the overall institutional performance of the GPF (US\$1 million) through the development and implementation of: (i) a new organizational structure; (ii) a results-oriented planning model, integrated with budget operations and supported by ICT; (iii) an internal audit model, based on modern internal control functions and risk analysis auditing consistent with public sector systems; (iv) an integrated human resource management system; (v) a financing model consistent with national systems and regulations, integrating budget, treasury, accounting and acquisitions functions supported by a computer application; (vi) corporate programme and public education campaigns to strengthen its image and build public confidence; and (vii) developing sustainable partnerships with communities.

### **3. Community action (US\$3.4 million)**

- 2.9 The objective of this component is to implement social development interventions addressing crime and violence prevention in disadvantaged, low-income neighborhoods of Regions IV and VI. All communities from Region IV and VI are eligible. The first five communities identified are: Port Mourant, Rose Hall, Annandale, Buxton and Sophia. Another 5 will be identified according to the established selection criteria: i) size (between 3,000-17,000 residents); ii) ethnic/racial representation<sup>17</sup>; iii) demonstrated willingness to work across ethnic,

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<sup>17</sup> Given ethnic distrust and polarization, the selected communities should include both homogenous and heterogeneous communities: 1 of the next 5 communities will be least 70 % Afro-Guyanese; 1 of the next 5 communities should be least 70 % Indo-Guyanese; the remaining eligible communities should be ethnically mixed (no ethnic group exceeds 60%).

racial groups<sup>18</sup>; iv) variance in crime and violence problems;<sup>19</sup>; and v) community assets<sup>20</sup>.

2.10 The component will finance for those communities selected technical assistance and equipment and minor rehabilitation in the following areas:

- a. Mobilization of communities (US\$620,000) Experts in resident engagement and mobilization will be contracted to assist in: (i) development, and implementation of actions for engaging the community; (ii) conducting assessments; and (iii) monitoring project performance.

These experts will also train local voluntary workers to develop Community Promoters for Citizen Co-existence, to address the shortfall of trained professionals. Training on core competencies in violence and crime prevention, community organizing, basic crisis intervention, resident engagement, advocacy, fundraising and evaluation, and how to build local infrastructures of expertise for collective violence prevention activity will be provided by experts. The training will provide guides on violence issues identified in the community assessment, such as: most effective ways to approach the prevention of violence; how to work in partnership with police to improve police-community relations, access existing resources; care for neighbors who have been impacted by violence; education about their rights and responsibilities under the law; parenting skills, anger management for teens, among other activities. The Curriculum and tools developed will be illustrated, accessible, and culturally sensitive.

- b. Community Violence Prevention Services (US\$2.7 million) will finance a menu of prevention activities in the selected communities of Regions IV and VI that address crime and violence problems identified in the community assessments such as: (i) factors leading to child abuse, dating violence and delinquency and violent offending and intimate partner violence; (ii) situational crime prevention (such as the creation of safe community spaces, community gardens, exterior lighting, among others.)<sup>21</sup>; and (iii)

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<sup>18</sup> Communities will need to describe past activities conducted and/or demonstrate willingness through the submission of 10 letters of commitment from community leaders, groups and organizations.

<sup>19</sup> Communities will be selected based on: a) severity of problem (number of homicides, assaults, reported abuse cases), and b) variation in types of crime and violence problems – such as collective violence (ethno-violence); interpersonal violence (such as youth violence, child abuse and neglect, intimate partner violence); and institutional violence (police-community).

<sup>20</sup> Community assets will be obtained through: i) mobilization and planning; ii) systematic assessment to identify violence problems and prevention assets in the community iii) the identification, ranking and prioritization of focus areas, existing resources and most suitable solutions; iv) development of project plans to implement solutions with goals and objectives, and v) monitoring and evaluating the strategies and solutions. This 5-step process gives each community a voice in recommending initiatives of highest relevance. The PIV will do the final selection of the proposal initiatives (see paragraph 3.13)

<sup>21</sup> This component will not finance the following: routine road infrastructure construction and rehabilitation; vehicles; construction of buildings; nor any control intervention.

improvement of formal services provided by various sectors (such as health, education, human services, youth and sports and local government, private sector and police). Activities funded will target individual, relationship, community and societal level contexts.

Not all services will be provided in each community. The PIU, Community Action Specialist, and violence prevention experts will help narrow the scope of services selected, in order to favor short-term impact, low cost interventions to yield greater efficiency and more visible results, and interventions that seek to reduce immediate triggers of criminal and violent behavior in the varied communities.

- c. Strengthening community based multi-service centers, (US\$ 150,000) as hubs to house community activities within existing, or underused or unused facilities. They will house materials and serve as a meeting space and coordination site for community and other participants. Centers will be staffed by community residents in partnerships with Ministry of Local Government, hired on a stipend basis. Loan resources will also finance computer equipment and a crime and violence prevention library.

#### **4. Programme Management (US\$2 million)**

- 2.11 The PIU expenses include, among others, costs for personnel, as detailed in paragraph 3.2, equipment, a vehicle and other administrative expenses. It will also cover expenses related to the technical unit that will be in charge of the modernization of the GPF.

#### **5. Concurrent costs and unallocated expenses**

- 2.12 The concurrent cost component includes the repayment of the PROPEF for US\$1 million, auditing US\$75,000) and for the implementation of the monitoring and supervision system (US\$200,000). An additional US\$ 0.5 million has been included for unallocated expenses. The Programme will not finance recurrent costs.

#### **C. Cost and financing**

- 2.13 The total cost of the programme is estimated at US\$22 million of which the Bank will finance US\$19.8 million (90% of the total) and the GoG will provide US\$ 2.2 million in counterpart financing. The Bank resources will finance a combination of consultancy services, materials, equipment, training, infrastructure rehabilitation, financial expenses during execution and unallocated expenditure. A summary breakdown of the programme costs by component and source of funds is presented in Table II-1 below:

Cost Table II-1

CATEGORIES	TOTAL			
	IDB-FSO	LOCAL	TOTAL	% TOTAL
<b>1. Administration</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>2200</b>	<b>10,0%</b>
1.2.1 Project Implement. Unit	2000	200	2200	10,0%
<b>2. Direct Costs.....</b>	<b>15855</b>	<b>1281</b>	<b>17136</b>	<b>77,9%</b>
<b>2.1 Capacity Building MoHA.....</b>	<b>4480</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>4657</b>	<b>21,2%</b>
2.1.1 Crime Observ.Tech Assist. Soft.....	915	0	915	4,2%
2.1.2 Policies, Interv & Media Camp.....	1300	50	1350	6,1%
2.1.3 Impact evaluations.....	500	0	500	2,3%
2.1.4 Staff and young prof training	575	57	632	2,9%
2.1.5 National Surveys.....	240	0	240	1,1%
2.1.6 Strength Administ Areas...	600	0	600	2,7%
2.1.7 Physical Infrast. & IT Equipment..	350	70	420	1,9%
<b>2.2 Capacity Building GPF.....</b>	<b>7950</b>	<b>763</b>	<b>8713</b>	<b>39,6%</b>
2.2.1 Data Collection and Analysis .....	250	15	265	1,2%
2.2.2 Staff Training .....	1600	100	1700	7,7%
2.2.3 Traffic management .....	100	20	120	0,5%
2.2.4 Buildings, IT and Lab equip.....	5000	528	5528	25,1%
2.2.5 Strength Administrative Areas .....	1000	100	1100	5,0%
<b>2.3. Community-Based Interven.....</b>	<b>3425</b>	<b>341</b>	<b>3766</b>	<b>17,1%</b>
2.3.1 Mobil. of comm. and build coh....	620	61	681	3,1%
2.3.2 Violence prevention services	2655	265	2920	13,3%
2.3.3 Multi-purpose facilities....	150	15	165	0,8%
<b>3. Concurrent Costs.....</b>	<b>1275</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1275</b>	<b>5,8%</b>
3.1 PROPEF.....	1000	0	1000	4,5%
3.2 Monitoring and Supervision.....	200	0	200	0,9%
3.3 Auditing.....	75	0	75	0,3%
<b>SUB TOTAL.....</b>	<b>19130</b>	<b>1481</b>	<b>20611</b>	<b>93,7%</b>
<b>4. UNALLOCATED.....</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>2,1%</b>
4.1 Contingencies.....	472	0	472	2,1%
<b>5. FINANCIAL EXPENSES.....</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>917</b>	<b>4,2%</b>
5.1 INTERESTS.....	0	514	514	2,3%
5.2 COMMITMENT FEE.....	0	205	205	0,9%
5.3 F.I.V.....	198	0	198	0,9%
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>19800</b>	<b>2200</b>	<b>22000</b>	<b>100,0%</b>
% AÑOS/PROYECTO.....	90,0%	10,0%	100,0%	

**D. Terms and conditions of the loan**

2.14 The Bank's lending in the amount of US\$19.8 million will be distributed over a five-year implementation period. Bank financing will be drawn from the Fund for Special Operations. The terms and conditions of the loan are presented in Table II-2.

Source of Funds	Fund for Special Operations
Amount	US\$19.8 million
Amortization Period	40 years
Grace Period	10 years
Interest Rate	1% first 10 years, 2% thereafter
Inspection and Supervision	1% of the loan amount
Credit fee	0.5% per year on the undisbursed amounts
Currency	US dollars

### **III. PROGRAM EXECUTION**

#### **A. The borrower and executing agency**

- 3.1 The borrower of this operation will be the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. The Programme will be executed by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). MoHA will delegate responsibility for implementation to a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), specially created and attached to the Ministry for this purpose. The PIU will be responsible for operational and financial administration, including planning, coordination, supervision and monitoring of all aspects of the programme implementation, as well as report preparation, procurement, disbursement of the programme resources and interface with the Bank and GoG officials, as well as strengthening the Policy Research Unit. The PIU will ensure that all aspects of the programme operating regulations are duly adhered to.

#### **B. Project implementation and administration**

- 3.2 The programme will be implemented by MoHA, in partnership with Social Sector line Ministries (MoCYS, MoLHSSS, MoEd, MoH and Ministry of Regional Development) over five years, with the management and coordination responsibilities being delegated to the Coordinator of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The core of the PIU was established with resources of the Project Preparation and Execution Facility for the Citizen Security Program (1653/SF-GY) and has participated in the preparation of the Programme. It should be noted that there are PROPEF resources available the PIU until the program is declared eligible for disbursements. The unit is comprised of a Coordinator (reporting to the Permanent Secretary of the MoHA) already contracted and acting as project manager; an information technology specialist responsible for providing technical support regarding the implementation of the different information systems; a community action specialist responsible for overall community action activities; a financial specialist responsible for the financial administration; a procurement specialist responsible for the acquisition of all goods and services; and an administrative assistant to provide support to the PIU. If needed the PIU will hire additional administrative assistance.
- 3.3 The responsibilities of the PIU will be as follows: (i) prepare annual operating plans and monitor the implementation of programme activities; (ii) ensure the achievement of outcomes through the monitoring of indicators; (iii) ensure implementation of the different components in a coordinated manner; (iv) prepare revised procurement plans semi-annually, as well as, the procurement of goods and contracting of services; (v) coordinate the preparation of technical reports and the semi-annual reports; (vi) maintain separate and specific bank accounts for managing the Bank's loan and local counterpart funds; (vii) submit timely disbursement requests and the corresponding justification of expenses; (viii) implement and maintain adequate systems for the management of contracts and finances, and internal controls with respect to the management of the IDB, in accordance with the Bank's requirements; (ix) prepare and submit Project

financial reports required by the Bank, including the financial statements of the components of the Programme under their responsibility; it is expected that annual audited financial statements would be prepared by an independent private firm contracted under Bank procedure; and (x) maintain an adequate documentation filing system to support eligible expenses to be examined by the Bank and the external auditors.

- 3.4 Change managers (2) will be appointed to oversee the modernization of the GPF and the MoHA, and their work will be coordinated by the PIU. The change manager of the MoHA will be a senior ranking staff member selected by the Minister and supported by an international expert in institutional modernization. The international experts to design and implement the modernization process will be contracted by the PIU, who will also monitor the process.
- 3.5 The change manager of the GPF will be a high-ranking police officer selected by the Police Commissioner and supported by an oversight commission of international experts in police reform. Each area of reform of the GPF (human resource, financial management, institutional management and information) will also have a police officer as a leader of the implementation of the modernization process. The oversight commission of international experts will be contracted by the PIU to provide support to the change team. The work of this team will be coordinated by the PIU at the Ministry of Home Affairs. The specific responsibilities of the change teams or change leaders will be to assist in the preparation or review of terms of reference for the consulting services, provide technical evaluation of proposals, review technical reports and assist the PIU in the preparation of the annual operating plans by providing, monitoring indicators of the modernization process. MOHA, with the support of the PIU, will monitor the implementation of the modernization process. In relation to the equipping, redesign and rehabilitation of police stations, training facility and construction of the crime laboratory, the Planning, Maintenance and Construction Departments of the GPF will be responsible for the supervision of the contractors hired to perform the different works. That department of the GPF has the appropriate staff with the technical capacity to perform this activity.
- 3.6 In relation to the Crime Observatory, primary data collected (from the GPF and Georgetown Hospital) will be corroborated and validated by an already established Operations Committee. The Policy and Research Unit will be the secretariat of the Operations and the Policy Committees. Members of the Operations Committee are: MoHA, whose representative chairs the monthly meetings; representatives of the Guyana Police Force responsible for crime and traffic data; a representative from the Hospital Medical Records unit from the Georgetown Public Hospital; an epidemiologist and/or representative of the Statistical Unit.
- 3.7 A high level Policy Committee (PC) chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs will be established. It will review the information from the Crime Observatory and the Operations Committee in order to take decisions with regard to evaluating policy

design and initiate strategic plans for the prevention and control of violence and unintentional injury prevention. Members of this committee are: Minister of Home Affairs; Police Commissioner, Minister of Health, Public Prosecutor, Minister of Education; Minister of Labor, Human Services and Social Security; Minister of Regional Development as well as the representative of the private sector, and representatives of Faith-Based Organizations. The Policy Research Unit in MoHA will act as the secretariat for the meetings with support from the PIU.

- 3.8 The implementation of the Community Action component will be led by the Community Action Specialist of the PIU with support from the PRU. The PIU will supervise the implementation of this component and report to the Permanent Secretary. Selection of communities, community mobilization and assessments, and project priority identification and selection will be conducted in accordance with procedures established in the programme's operating regulations and resource manual agreed between GoG/MoHA and the Bank.
- 3.9 Responsibility for the monitoring and supervision of the respective components in the observatory will be assigned to a Research Officer within the MoHA's Policy and Research Unit. The Research Officer will receive training in the implementation of the monitoring system based on the Programme logical framework model. The PIU has overall supervision and evaluation responsibility.
- 3.10 Responsibility for internal audit of the Programme will be assigned to an Internal Auditor within the Administrative Division of the MoHA. This individual will provide internal control for both financial as well as procedural matters and will help ensure that approved procedures are adhered to as specified in the Programme's Operating Manual and in accordance with the financial regulations and laws of Guyana.

#### 1. Implementation of the Community Action Component

- 3.11 MoHA will conduct a workshop for prospective communities. It will include an overview of the Citizen Security Programme and Community Action Component; the criteria for community selection, and a presentation on the mobilization and planning requirements and assessment steps needed. Workshop participants will have an opportunity to engage in a local violence analysis and planning work session facilitated by the PIU. Applicant communities must be represented by diverse teams of at least 12 individuals willing to serve as part of the CAC (such as Neighborhood Development Council (NDC) leaders, police, educator, citizen leader, women's group, youth, local business or religious leader, concerned parent). CAO candidates should also be identified as part of the application package. Community applicants must present evidence that they obtained the support of an NDC or neighborhood NGO to cover recurrent costs related to activities to be financed by the Programme.

- 3.12 A Community Action Officer (CAO) will be contracted by the PIU for each selected community. The CAO will be overseen by the Community Action Specialist at the PIU. CAO's will facilitate the project preparation activities related to Community action component, liaise and serve as the local focal point for their communities, establishing formal and informal linkages with community-based associations and organizations.
- 3.13 The CAOs and CAC,s will be trained to: 1) help each community articulate and prepare a proposal for a rapid impact projects (up toUS\$5000 per community); 2) identify and prepare community violence prevention services proposals from the priority crime and violence problems identified in the needs assessment. CAOs will work jointly with CACs, PIU and Community Action Specialists and experts to choose which priority projects are proposed under the community assessment. Priority will be given to projects based on: 1) the severity of crime and/or violence addressed;2) frequency and rates (including rates of change) or violence addressed; 3) types of problems that pose the greatest risk; 4) types of problems that cause people the greatest concern ; 5) types of problems that will have the greatest impact and reduction potential based on existing best practice; 6) cost and sustainability; and 7) builds on local capacity. The MoHA through the PIU will approve the final community assessment and the list of projects to be financed. Up to \$150,000 will be available violence prevention services for each community.

### **C. Programme Operating Regulations**

- 3.14 A draft of an implementation and operating manual that establishes basic operating procedures for the program has been agreed. This manual sets forth administrative and financial rules, instruments and procedures for carrying out routine operational tasks, timelines and costs by sub-components. It outlines the steps and assigns responsibilities to ensure efficient administration, transparency and due diligence. **The MoHA will present evidence that the operating manual agreed with the Bank has entered into effect as a condition prior to first disbursement.**

### **D. Procurement of goods and services**

- 3.15 The procurement of goods and services, the contracting of works, and the selection and contracting of consulting services will be carried out by the Executing Agency in accordance with Bank policies and procedures set forth in documents GN-2349-6 and GN-2350-6 dated February 2006. The works are expected to be below the threshold for international competitive bidding (ICB) of US\$1 million equivalent. Works costing less than US\$1 million and more than US\$250,000 will be contracted through national competitive bidding (NCB) and by price shopping for contracts costing US\$250,000 or less. ICB will be used for procurements of goods and related services in amounts greater than or equal to the equivalent of US\$250,000. For goods and services costing less than US\$250,000 but more than US\$50,000, NCB will be used. For contract in amounts equal to or

less than US\$50,000 price shopping will be used. Consulting services costing US\$200,000 or more will be announced internationally. The selection and contracting of consulting services will be carried out in accordance with the Quality-and Cost-Based Selection procedure set forth in document 2350-6. Short lists composed exclusively of national consultants may be used for contracts under US\$200,000. The procurement Plan of the Programme is in Annex II.

## **E. Maintenance**

3.16 The maintenance of MOHA infrastructure that has been rehabilitated and refurbished will be the responsibility of the Ministry and financed from its recurrent budget. The GPF will be responsible for the maintenance of the new crime laboratory, training facilities and the rehabilitation of the police stations, also coming from its capital budget. The new buildings will be designed so that materials used will require a minimum level of maintenance. The GPF will also include in its annual budget the funds required to conduct the appropriate maintenance. The maintenance of the multi-purpose community facilities and any other community-based programme will be the responsibility of the local government authorities and residents (CAC, NDC or town council, Regional Democratic Council). Maintenance reports on all works conducted and equipment acquired under the programme will be prepared and submitted to the Bank on an annual basis during execution and for five years after programme completion.

3.17 In relation to the maintenance of the multi-purpose centers, a written agreement will be prepared and signed by the local government authority indicating commitment and responsibility for maintenance -- a requirement to be included in the programme's operation regulations and as part of the community assessments. A maintenance subcommittee of each local government authority will be established while the facility is being refurbished or rehabilitated, with specific responsibility for managing and coordinating structure maintenance activities and each member will be given training on the importance of maintenance, management and fund raising. In addition, representatives from each of the communities will be contracted under the program on a stipend basis to serve as facility managers.

## **F. Implementation period and disbursement schedule**

3.18 Loan proceeds are expected to be disbursed according to the following schedule:

<b>Table III-1 Disbursement Schedule (US\$000)</b>							
<b>Source</b>	<b>Year 1</b>	<b>Year 2</b>	<b>Year 3</b>	<b>Year 4</b>	<b>Year 5</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
IDB	5,010	4,217	4,429	3,732	2,411	19,800	90.0
Local	390	614	499	461	235	2,200	10.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,400</b>	<b>4,832</b>	<b>4,928</b>	<b>4,194</b>	<b>2,646</b>	<b>22,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>
% Year	24.5	22	22.4	19.1	12	100%	

## **G. Monitoring and supervision**

- 3.19 The Policy and Research Unit, through a research officer currently being contracted, will be in charge of monitoring the performance and progress of programme implementation. Programme monitoring will be based on the implementation of annual operating plans. On November 30<sup>th</sup> of each year, the PIU will prepare an operating plan for the following year. This plan will also contain an evaluation of the results obtained during the previous period, and if needed, include a justification and recommended actions regarding the goals not achieved during the period in question. The annual review by the MoHA and the Bank will also evaluate progress in the implementation of the activities related to capacity building of the MoHA, capacity building of the GPF and in the efficacy of evidence-based national policies and implementation of community actions. The first operating plan is under preparation and will be part of the initial report of the program. The monitoring of the program will evaluate the extent of the implementation of the agreed chronogram of activities, as well as contractual conditions and indicators included in the Logical Framework, attached as Annex I. The monitoring and supervision system will entail the following: (i) collect and systematize information regarding the progress implementation of activities and availability of funds; (ii) maintain up to date information regarding the implementation of the Programme's activities; and (iii) systematize the information emanating from the different evaluations of programme's activities.
- 3.20 The Policy and Research Unit will receive specialized training to take on the responsibility for conducting impact evaluation during the project. Loan resources will finance technical assistance for the final design and implementation of these evaluations. Impacts on violence and crime will be estimated by the percentage of reduction in risk factors, increase in protective factors and decrease in fear by comparing participating and nonparticipating communities. The attribution to the Program will be likely based on the statistical method of difference-in-difference comparison of those indicators before and after intervention based on baseline and subsequent data from the Safe Neighborhood Surveys, augmented by Crime Observatory data and specialized evaluations of interventions carried out in the targeted communities, all financed from loan resources.
- 3.21 **Launch workshop.** A project launch workshop will be held as close as possible to the date that the program is declared eligible for disbursements to re-familiarize all parties engaged in program execution with their responsibilities, the program's goals, the implementation plan, execution procedures and evaluation framework.
- 3.22 **Reports.** During programme implementation, the PIU will present to the Bank semi-annual progress reports, to be presented within 30 days of the end of the semester, summarizing the execution and financial highlights of the period. The report will also take into consideration the indicators of the Logical Framework and other agreed goals. The second semiannual report will represent the Annual Operating Plan for the following year.

- 3.23 **Mid-term evaluation.** The mid-term review will be undertaken after the implementation of the following: Crime Observatory has been operating for one year; MoHA has developed its strategic plan; GPF has elaborated a new organizational structure and revised its manual for internal and external accountability; and community assessments have been completed and list of priorities identified by communities and MoHA. A mid-term review mission will discuss with the MoHA the results from the implementation of each component and review the plan of the activities for the surveys that would be conducted in the second part of the project. For the mid-term evaluation, the MoHA will present the publications regarding the causes of external injuries and deaths, personnel of the MoHA trained in data collection and management, the results of the victimization and attitudes survey, the positions of the GPF that have been reclassified and the staff of GPF trained in criminal investigation.
- 3.24 **Final evaluation.** A final evaluation comprised of impact evaluations, as well as process evaluations, will be financed with project funds and will take place when 95% of loan resources are disbursed. The evaluation will assess the implementation of project and will document outcomes in participating agencies and communities. The objectives of the final evaluation are to assess: (a) the degree to which the project achieved its objectives; (b) the efficiency of the means used to address these objectives; (c) the factors that, in general, influenced program outcomes; (d) the factors that influenced variations in impacts across participating agencies and communities; (e) whether unexpected results are due to administrative factors; (f) the sustainability of the project results; and (g) the lessons learned with respect to building community cohesion and in the implementation of interventions to prevent crime and violence.
- 3.25 **Final assessment.** The PIU will collect, store and retain all necessary information, indicators and parameters, the mid-term review, and final evaluation, to enable the Bank to prepare the PCR.

#### **H. External financial audits**

- 3.26 The PIU will be responsible for the external auditor and shall present to the Bank annual audited financial statements of the program within 120 days of the end of each fiscal year, and a final financial statement, to be submitted within 120 days after the date of the last disbursement for the project. The audit reports will be prepared in accordance with terms of reference previously approved by the Bank. An independent auditor acceptable to the Bank will carry out the audit works under the Bank's requirements and will be selected under the Bank's bidding procedures (Document AF-200). The audit costs will be financed through the loan.

**I. Advance of funds**

- 3.27 A revolving fund of up to 5% of the loan will be established. The PIU will prepare and submit to the Bank semi-annual reports documenting the use of funds, within 60 days after the closing of each semester

**IV. VIABILITY AND RISKS**

**A. Institutional viability**

- 4.1 This programme will strengthen the capacity of the MoHA to design, implement and monitor violence and crime reduction activities through the extensive participation of the institution's staff in the design and implementation of capacity building activities. The Ministry staff already in place will work closely with experts to enable a transfer of skills to support sustainability of the programme's interventions. At the end of the Programme, the MoHA will be able to collect, analyze and evaluate crime and violence data, determine evidenced-led interventions for the prevention of problems identified. Moreover, the Policy and Research Unit will further be strengthened by the training of a cadre of local young professional interns (of varied disciplinary and sectoral backgrounds) in how to develop, implement, evaluate and disseminate varied types of crime and violence prevention policies, programmes, and strategies, along with the fundamentals of collaborative partnership building.
- 4.2 In relation to the modernization of the GPF, the structure proposed in which police officers lead the reform, supported by technical experts, has several features that contribute to its viability, such as: it develops a common methodology to manage the implementation of the reform; provides a framework for skills transfer to support sustainability; creates ability to monitor and allows for iteration; incorporates stakeholders views; prioritizes areas of development in line with available funding; coordinates donor effort; and revises GPF strategic plan.
- 4.3 Furthermore, proactive participatory mechanisms have been in place since the outset of the programme's conceptualization. Specifically, the determination of the composition of interventions for each community is the result of in-depth consultations with the residents and their leaders. Thus, the community action component can best contribute to the reduction of fear, crime and violence by creating mechanisms to: (i) strengthen the participation of residents, agencies, and businesses in community decision-making; (ii) build community leadership in violence prevention; (iii) promote community cohesion; (iv) improve well-being and socio-economic conditions; (v) influence the implementation of effective public policy that addresses risk factors associated with crime and victimization; and (vi) promote recognition of the strengths and capacities of the Guyanese communities and groups in preventing violence. Also, community residents will be trained on core competencies for violence and crime prevention, community

organizing, basic crisis intervention to develop capacity at the local level to assure the technical viability of the programme.

## **B. Socioeconomic viability**

- 4.4 As indicated in section I, a number of studies show that prevention is a cost-effective intervention to deal with crime and violence vis-à-vis control and suppression measures. The typical approximation to estimating benefits from citizen security programs consists of quantifying those savings that result from reduced crime and violence. Given the information available in Guyana and the level of aggregation with which is reported, it is possible to estimate annual expenditures by MoHA and GPF on security in the order of US\$18 million or 2.3% of the 2006 GDP.<sup>22</sup> Maintaining that ratio of saved expenditures over the five years of the program leads to a total US\$ 103 million in net present value<sup>23</sup>. This figure is only illustrative and cannot be taken as a precise estimate of the program benefits. On the one hand, it cannot be expected that all security expenditures be saved as the result of the Programme. On the other, savings in health, judicial, insurance or production costs due to crime and violence reduction are not included in the estimate. The approximation, however, shows that total benefits of the program are likely to exceed its costs.
- 4.5 The above approximation also substantiates the need to improve substantially the knowledge on cost-effective crime interventions in Guyana. The program will contribute towards generating periodic data and strengthening analytical capacity in the medium-term. As a result, relevant crime-reduction benefits should be identified and measured. In concrete, impact evaluations will determine which risk factors are more likely related to crime and violence and what preventive measures inhibiting such factors may be expected to be cost-effective. Community-based initiatives will also provide specific information on the role of social cohesion and community action in preventing violence, as well as the benefits of police and community collaboration.

## **C. Financial viability**

- 4.6 The fiscal situation of the country has deteriorated to a deficit of 13% of GDP. The estimated incremental costs of the program activities are US\$135,000, which is a minor increase in public expenditure. The financial viability of the programme has been analyzed in terms of the availability of counterpart resources for the Bank loan, as well as, the capacity of government and community stakeholders to meet incremental recurring costs associated with investments in infrastructure. With respect to counterpart funds, the government's annual

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<sup>22</sup> This estimate includes all current expenditures and, among capital expenditures, those related to buildings and equipment of MoHA and GPF, prisons related capital expenditures and community policing expenditures as reported by the 2006 Guyana's Estimated Budget.

<sup>23</sup> This calculation takes IMF projections of future economic growth, exchange rates and an interest rate of 13.32% (the latest reported weighted lending rate of the financial system as of March 29, 2006- Bank of Guyana).

contribution at most will represent approximately 1.5% of MoHA annual budget, which is considered an appropriate level. Satisfying counterpart obligations is not expected to be a risk to the programme.

- 4.7 The MoHA manages an annual budget of over US\$30 million. Recurrent costs represent approximately 79% of the annual budget and payroll accounts for 61% of these costs. The capital budget accounts for approximately 21% of the Ministry's overall budget of which the majority finances the agencies attached to the Ministry. In terms of the sustainability of recurrent costs related to the salaries of support staff for the strengthening of the Policy and Research Unit, it is estimated that these costs will amount to US\$50,000 annually, representing approximately 0.3% of the annual recurrent payroll expenditures. These costs will be included in the annual budget of the MoHA.
- 4.8 In terms of the infrastructure investments of the MoHA and the GPF, these costs have been dimensioned within budgetary constraints so that operation and maintenance will be sustained following completion of the programme. It is estimated an annual cost of another US\$85,000 (including maintenance expenses for laboratory and computer equipment), which represents 1.4% of the recurrent expenditure budget. These costs will be included in the annual budget of the MoHA and GPF. With regard to recurrent costs associated with multi-purpose community centers, the involvement of the CACs in overseeing the management of the centers, plus the strengthening of the committees during the programme in areas of maintenance, management and business development within the communities, should help ensure the sustainability of the centers. The sustained delivery of violence prevention services, though the need for these services in participating communities is expected to drop following programme completion, will be addressed through these community mobilization and strengthening efforts and through capacity building of CACs.

#### **D. Environmental and social impacts**

- 4.9 The programme is expected to have significant positive social impact as it will strengthen the institutional capacity of government institutions and civil society to address both the direct effect of violence on vulnerable populations and the correlative effect on long-term health and prosperity. Children exposed to violence are more likely than their peers to engage in violence when they are older; and intra-family violence is linked to reduced workplace productivity and reduced incomes over the long term. By addressing both the direct and cumulative effects of crime and violence, this program will contribute to improving the social context for vulnerable populations and ensure that future generations are also protected. Furthermore, the programme supports the wide participation of civil society in the identification of factors that contribute to crime and violence, as well as, in the development and implementation of solutions, which enhances the probability of ownership and sustainability of the activities.

- 4.10 This program will have negligible environmental impacts. The civil works activities financed by the project will be related to the new construction of facilities and rehabilitation or replacement of old and inadequate facilities and equipment with more modern and efficient ones. The construction of new facilities, as well as the rehabilitation or replacement of older facilities at the GPF the Ministry of Home Affairs and community centers will comply with the requirements established by the Environmental Protection Act of 1996. As a result, all procurement documents will include the necessary clauses requiring the compliance with the national legislation regarding environmental protection and mitigation of negative impacts related to the construction or rehabilitation of buildings, including sewerage treatment and handicap access, among others. To also assure a positive environmental impact, the design of the rehabilitated facilities will consider cost-effective actions directed to improve safety, energy conservation and waste management.

**E. Benefits and Beneficiaries**

- 4.11 Reduced level of violence in participating communities. The development of the integrated information system (Crime Observatory) and policy capacity building at the MoHA, the capacity building and modernization of the GPF, together with the Community Action component, which provides prevention services to participating communities of Regions IV and VI, can be expected to contribute to the reduction of violence in these communities. The lower levels of violence, in turn, will encourage the economic development of those communities as investment in both human and social capital is facilitated.
- 4.12 Social capital, citizen empowerment and democratization. The proposed program structure, process and characteristics can contribute to greater social capital and collective efficacy, increasing social cohesion and processes of communal engagement needed to act on behalf of a common good. The methodology proposed encourages the participation and representation of socially excluded groups, and encourages the development of norms and networks that can shape social, political and economic relations, by enhancing political and social integration and promoting pro-democratic values, attitudes and processes. It is well established in the literature that citizen participation can enhance governmental effectiveness as well as the democratization of the institutions of civil society.
- 4.13 Strengthened institutions. The development of an integrated information system, capacity building efforts at the MoHA, modernization of the GPF, together with cumulative violence prevention services can be expected to lead to more effective, streamlined and coordinated contributions to Guyana's national safety and social policy objectives. These initiatives can better prepare the GoG to develop solutions for short and mid term local community safety problems, and assist in their long term efforts to address the complex root causes of crime and violence, increasing the public's trust in the government's ability to effectively address crime and violence and impact the quality of life in regions, towns and villages in

Guyana. Increased levels of confidence in government, in turn, can encourage greater civic participation.

## **F. Risks**

- 4.14 Commitment to implement a comprehensive, participatory programme. The successful implementation of the proposed community approach is contingent upon continued resident engagement and the importance that central, regional and local government gives to community participation. It also faces the risk of weak implementation due to existing resource limitations, lack of inter-sectoral collaboration and a centralized political culture. The current operation has taken these factors into consideration from the very beginning of the preparation by adopting a participatory approach for the development of the proposed strategy. The operation also proposes a management and oversight structure that places a premium on creating collaborations, provides effective liaison at central government level between ministries and agencies that have a stake in citizen security. It also sustains effective partnerships both within the community, and with central governments and other agencies and organizations.
- 4.15 Commitment to implement GPF modernization. The institutional reform proposed in the Programme faces the potential risk of people's resistance to change due to existing resource limitations and adherence to the status quo. This can only be neutralized by continued strong leadership from the management of the GPF. The current operation has taken these factors into consideration from the very beginning of the preparation by adopting a participatory approach for the development of the reform strategy, seeking to build ownership from the organization's perspective, and developing a long-term strategic plan for the Guyana Police Force. For this purpose, meetings were held with groups from the operational and administrative areas of the GPF and with very intensive participation in the identification of problems, causes and solutions for the development of activities to be carried out by the modernization programme.
- 4.16 Absorptive capacity. The main institutions involved in project activities are weak and do not have extensive experience in implementing programmes similar in nature to the one proposed. Therefore, their absorptive capacity for new programs and initiatives is not very high. This situation may constrain the execution of the proposed Bank programme. The project will mitigate this factor by contracting consultants to provide technical assistance during the preparation and continuing through implementation, as well as focused institutional strengthening directed to transfer of knowledge to the local counterparts in MoHA and GPF, in order to enhance the sector's absorptive capacity in the short to medium term. Moreover, the project will seek the introduction of performance-based incentives for key staff in the PIU.
- 4.17 Election related violence. Even though violence has recently increased this is usually restricted to the periods before and after elections. Since elections are

scheduled for September 2006, this risk is not expected to affect the Programme's implementation.

**GUYANA**  
**Citizen Security Programme**  
**(GY-0071)**

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Goal</b> To enhance citizen security and improve peaceful coexistence among citizens by contributing towards the reduction of crime, violence and insecurity.</p>	<p>- Improvement in well-being indicators of the Guyanese population as a result of the reduction of crime and violence.</p>	<p>Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory  Victimization and Attitudes Surveys</p>	
<p><b>Purpose</b> To identify, prevent and counteract risk factors and increase and promote protective factors in communities, families and individuals.</p>	<p><i>3 years after the end of the Project</i> - Improvement in skills, attitudes and behaviour indicators obtained from the Victimization and Attitudes Survey. Such indicators will concretely refer to: increase from 56% to 67% Region IV and from 43% to 51% in Region VI the number of persons with an ability to control their anger and avoid a fight.  -Reduction in the number of undetermined deaths/crimes in Regions IV and VI from 35% to 15%</p>	<p>PIU reports/Victimization and Attitudes Surveys  PIU reports/Victimization and Attitudes Surveys  Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory Base line produced by GPF statistics.</p>	<p>Political commitment to improve citizen security is not affected by elections  Political, economic and social conditions do not deteriorate.  Absorptive capacity of government institutions are improved</p>

To strengthen the capabilities of MoHA and GPF to implement crime preventive programmes at the national and local levels.	<p>-Perception in the confidence of the GPF (Reduction from 34% in Region IV and from 36% in Region VI to 26% and 25%, respectively in the perception that the GPF is not doing a good job in preventing crime)</p> <p>Perception of insecurity is decreased (Reduction from 42% to 34% in Region IV and 49% to 39% in Region VI the insecurity index measured by not feeling safe on the streets of their community at night).</p>	<p>PIU reports</p> <p>Victimization and Attitudes Survey</p>	
To strengthen social cohesion within communities and its crime preventive capacity.	Increase from 68% to 75% in Region IV and from 76% to 83% in Region in the willingness of neighbors to get involved and help each other out.	<p>PIU Reports</p> <p>Victimization Surveys</p>	
<p><b>Component 1 Capacity Building of MoHA</b></p> <p>i. Integrated crime and violence information system implemented (Crime Observatory) and surveillance system implemented.</p>	<p><i>By the end of Project</i></p> <p>-Monthly reports by MoHA on crime and violence indicators published by third quarter 2007.</p> <p>-100% of MoHA research unit staff trained in data collection and formulation of policies.</p> <p>-Reduction in the number of undetermined deaths/crimes in Regions IV and VI from 30% to 15%</p> <p><i>-Mid-term:</i> Crime observatory has been operating for two years.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Annual reports from PIU.</li> <li>- Project reports and documentation</li> <li>- MoHA human resource development report</li> <li>- Project reports and documentation</li> <li>- Statistical Catalogue Published</li> <li>- Data management manual published</li> <li>- Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory</li> </ul>	<p>Continued commitment of MoHA and GOG in implementing in preventive approach to citizen security.</p> <p>Preventive citizen security policies are implemented</p>
ii. Formulation of prevention and interventions policies implemented	-At least 5 targeted interventions implemented in selected communities related to risk factors identified by the Crime Observatory.	- PIU annual reports	
iii. Effective mechanism for broad based dissemination of crime data implemented	-MoHA website functioning by third quarter 2007 with monthly updates. Quarterly bulletins published starting fourth quarter 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Website functioning</li> <li>- Bulletins available in public domain</li> </ul>	

iv. Campaigns to foster positive attitudinal change and promote peaceful coexistence implemented	-At least 25 media campaigns implemented related to risk factors detected by the Crime Observatory - 20% of improvement in indicators related to attitudes to violence	- PIU annual reports  - Victimization and attitudes survey	
v. Development of an impact evaluation system implemented	- 3 interventions per community evaluated	- PIU annual reports	
vi. Strategic Action Plan for the Ministry developed	- 80% of recommendations of new strategic plan implemented - -80% reduction in the time spent on processing requests	- PIU annual reports	
<b>Component 2. Capacity Building of the Guyana Police Force.</b>	<b><i>By the end of Project</i></b>		
i. Updated Crime reporting information system implemented	Monthly reports by GPF on crime indicators published	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
ii. Training in crime prevention, on human rights related to police activities, conflict resolution, anger management, relations with the public and the media; addressing domestic violence and child abuse cases implemented	-100% of rank and file staff trained on crime prevention, human rights protection, conflict resolution, anger management and handling of domestic violence and child abuse  -Reduction in the number of undetermined deaths/crimes in Regions IV and VI from 30% to 15%	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report - Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory	
iii. Crime laboratory built and operating	Equipped and staffed crime laboratory in operation	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
iv. Police Stations rehabilitated	-65 police stations rehabilitated	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	

v. New traffic management plan designed	-Revised Legislation published - 100% staff trained in revised legislation - 5 campaigns educate the public on road safety - New traffic management standards implemented	GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
vi. Institutional Modernization of the GPF	- new organizational structure implemented - 5 reports of the new financial, budget and planning system published - Statutory regulations regarding recruitment, promotion and retirement published - 5 reports of the new financial, budget and planning system published - New strategy implemented - 5 reports utilizing the new system published	GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
<b>Component 3 Community Action</b>	<b>By the end of project</b>		Continued resident engagement and the importance that central, regional and local government gives to community participation  GoG provides resources, collaboration and provides effective liaison at central government level between ministries and agencies that have a stake in citizen security
i. Situational control- rapid-impact and violence reduction community projects implemented	-30 projects implemented - Reduction from 42% to 34% in Region IV and 49% to 39% in Region VI the insecurity index measured by not feeling safe on the streets of their community at night.	PIU annual reports	
ii. Socio-cognitive skills programs implemented (e.g. conflict resolution, coexistence promotion, anger management, parenting training, moral reasoning)	- 5 socio-cognitive skills programs implemented per community  - Increase from 56% to 67% Region IV and from 43% to 51% in Region VI the number of persons with an ability to control their anger and avoid a fight	Victimization and attitudes surveys PIU annual reports	

iii. Increased resident participation and empowerment implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 100 trained adults as lay workers developing and implementing community action projects</li> <li>- 100 trained youths as lay workers developing and implementing community action projects</li> <li>- 20 partnerships (formal engagement of government and civil society)</li> <li>- 20% increased in indicators of interpersonal trust and participation in community organizations</li> <li>- 20% increased reporting of victimization experiences in communities</li> <li>- 20% improvement in the perception of trust towards community organizations and public institutions</li> </ul> <p><b>Midterm evaluation:</b> community assessment completed and priorities identified by communities and MoHA.</p>	Victimization and attitudes surveys	
iv. School based violence prevention programs	<p>-500 children and teachers trained on violence prevention.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 10 school based violence prevention programs implemented and evaluated</li> <li>- Incorporation of 3 effective school based violence prevention policies per participating schools</li> </ul>	PIU annual reports	
v. Multi-purpose community resource centres rehabilitated	<p>-10 centres built and operational</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Incorporation of 3 effective community recreation centres violence prevention policies per participating community</li> </ul>	PIU annual reports	
vi. Short term rapid impact quick win projects implemented	10 quick win projects implemented	PIU annual reports	

DOCUMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

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06/06/2006

PROPOSED RESOLUTION DE-\_\_/06

Guyana. Loan \_\_\_\_/SF-GY to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana  
Citizen Security Programme

The Board of Executive Directors

RESOLVES:

That the President of the Bank, or such representative as he shall designate, is authorized, in the name and on behalf of the Bank, to enter into such contract or contracts as may be necessary with the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, as Borrower, for the purpose of granting it a financing to cooperate in the execution of the citizen security programme. Such financing will be for an amount of up to US\$19,800,000, or its equivalent in other currencies, except that of Guyana, which are part of the resources of the Bank's Fund for Special Operations ("FSO"), and will be subject to the Financial Terms and Conditions and the Special Contractual Conditions of the Project Summary of the Loan Proposal.

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GY-0071